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 NOTE 
What’s Missing? Addressing the Inadequate 
LGBT Protections in the Missouri Human 
Rights Act 
Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), 
transfer denied, No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 26, 2016) 
(mem.) 
Ellen Henrion* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most Missourians can move into homes with their partners, put up pic-
tures of their spouses at their workplace desks, or book a hotel room for an 
overnight stay with a carefree confidence that these actions will not result in 
harassment or discriminatory repercussions.  Unfortunately, this is not true 
for all of the state’s residents.  Approximately 160,000 adults in Missouri 
identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender (“LGBT”).1  According-
ly, approximately 160,000 adults in Missouri are particularly vulnerable to 
workplace, housing, and public accommodations discrimination as the Mis-
souri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Missouri’s general anti-discrimination 
statute, does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
or gender identity.2  In 2015, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western Dis-
trict, held in Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp. that the MHRA’s prohi-
bition on sex-based discrimination does not extend to prohibit sexual orienta-
tion-based discrimination.3  Though many of Missouri’s businesses – includ-
 
* B.A., Maryville University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2017; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I am incredibly 
grateful to Professor Rafael Gely for his thoughtful insight and guidance throughout 
the writing process and to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their invaluable 
feedback and suggestions. 
 1. Christy Mallory et al., Employment, Housing, and Public Accommodations 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Missouri, 
WILLIAMS INST. 1 (Sept. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/MissouriNDReport-Nov-2013.pdf. 
 2. See MO. REV STAT. §§ 213.040, 213.055, 213.065 (2000).  Sexual orientation 
is an individual’s emotional, physical, or romantic attraction to others.  GLADD Me-
dia Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, 
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).  Gender 
identity is an individual’s personal and internal sense of gender.  Id. 
 3. 478 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
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ing some of its largest, such as Ameren, Express Scripts, and Monsanto4 – 
have workplace policies that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity,5 these protections are insufficient to truly protect Mis-
sourians from discrimination.  Internal policies do not provide the threat of 
legal repercussions upon discrimination and, accordingly, may not have the 
deterrent effect of a law.  Furthermore, employment anti-discrimination poli-
cies do nothing to protect LGBT Missourians from housing or public accom-
modations discrimination.  Missouri’s anti-discrimination law is simply inad-
equate or, at the very least, incomplete. 
Though great strides in LGBT rights have been made in the United 
States over the last decades,6 including the 2015 victory in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,7 the Missouri General Assembly remains hesitant to expand anti-
discrimination protections to all of its constituents.8  Missouri’s refusal to 
codify anti-discrimination protections for its LGBT citizens ensures that Mis-
souri will remain playing catch-up to nationwide progress.  This Note argues 
that it is time for Missouri to fully protect its citizens from discrimination.  
Missouri must amend the MHRA to prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
James Pittman, a gay man, worked as a controller at Cook Paper Recy-
cling Corporation from April 2004 until December 2011.9  Throughout 
Pittman’s employment, Cook Paper’s President, Joe Jurden, allegedly di-
rected many homophobic remarks towards Pittman.10  Pittman claimed that 
Jurden had inquired whether he had AIDS, among other discriminatory com-
ments.11  Further, Pittman claimed that when he ended a romantic relation-
ship, he was treated “more harshly than a male [coworker] who was getting a 
 
 4. Employer Database, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
http://asp.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search.asp?form=private_detailed_search.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2017) (search for Headquarters State: Missouri; Key Policies: 
Sexual Orientation in Non-discrimination Policy and Gender identity in Non-
discrimination Policy). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); see also United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 7. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 8. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 9. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015), No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 26, 2016) (mem.). 
 10. Id.  Jurden denies these allegations.  See Zack Ford, Gay Man Was Harassed 
at Work for Being a ‘Cocksucker,’ Court Says It Won’t Do a Thing About It, 
THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 30, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/10/30/3717515/missouri-discrimination-ruling/. 
 11. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 481. 
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divorce from his female wife.”12  Pittman was terminated by Cook Paper in 
December 2011.13  Thereafter, Pittman sued his former employer, alleging 
that his sexual orientation was a “contributing factor in the decision of [Cook 
Paper] to terminate his employment”14 in violation of the MHRA’s prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination.15  Cook Paper filed a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.16 
The trial court granted Cook Paper’s motion and dismissed Pittman’s 
petition for failure to state a claim.17  The court determined that Pittman had 
merely alleged discrimination on the basis of his sexual orientation rather 
than his sex.18  Because they found no allegation of sex-based discrimination, 
the court found no cognizable claim under the MHRA.19  The court further 
declined to “create [a] new cause[] of action” by recognizing a claim of “sex-
ual stereotyping.”20 
On appeal, Pittman argued that, by alleging that he was harassed and 
terminated on account of his sexual orientation, he had sufficiently stated a 
claim for sex discrimination under the MHRA.21  In this case of first impres-
sion, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, disagreed, affirming 
the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition.22  Finding the statute’s 
plain language “clear and unambiguous,”23 the court held that the MHRA’s 
prohibition on sex-based discrimination does not extend beyond discrimina-
tion based on gender.24  The Western District also looked to legislative intent 
and reasoned that if the Missouri legislature had wanted to designate sexual 
orientation as a protected status under the MHRA, it could have easily done 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Appellant’s Initial Brief at 5, Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 
S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (No. WD77973), 2015 WL 1265641, at *5. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 481. 
 17. Id.  Pittman also filed a retaliation claim, which the trial court did not dis-
miss.  Id. at 480 n.1.  Pittman later voluntarily dismissed the retaliation claim without 
prejudice.  Id. 
 18. Id. at 481. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 482. 
 22. Id. at 481–82.  The Supreme Court of Missouri denied transfer.  Pittman v. 
Cook Paper Recycling Corp., No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 26, 
2016) (mem.). 
 23. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 482. 
 24. Id. 
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so explicitly.25  Missouri law, the court concluded, does not prohibit discrim-
ination based upon sexual orientation.26 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Part A focuses on state law anti-discrimination protections in Missouri 
and neighboring states, discussing the MHRA and providing an overview of 
state law protections (or lack thereof) for LGBT individuals.  Part B similarly 
surveys comparative federal law and the extent of its protections for individu-
als from sexual orientation-based discrimination. 
A.  State Protections 
1.  The Missouri Human Rights Act 
State law claims of discrimination of any kind are brought under the 
MHRA, which was originally codified in 1959.27  At its inception, the dis-
crimination protections the MHRA provided were limited,28 prohibiting only 
“unfair treatment based on race or national ancestry.”29  Two decades later, 
the Act was amended to afford individuals much more expansive protec-
tions.30  In its current state, the MHRA protects Missourians from housing 
discrimination,31 employment discrimination,32 and discrimination in public 
accommodations33 on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
ancestry, or disability.34  Sexual orientation is not currently an explicitly pro-
tected status under the MHRA.35 
 
 25. Id. at 483.  As discussed below, the Missouri General Assembly has had 
numerous opportunities to pass such legislation and has failed to do so.  See infra Part 
III.A.1. 
 26. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 483. 
 27. Casey Murray, Missouri Human Rights Act Anniversary This Month, 
SPENCER FANE: HUM. RESOURCE SOLUTIONS (Aug. 21, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.spencerfane.com/hrsolutions/blog.aspx?entry=132. 
 28. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1959) (current version at MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
213.010–213.137 (West 2016)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1978) (current version at MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
213.010–213.137 (West 2016)).  The MHRA was amended to define discrimination 
as “any unfair treatment based on race, national origin, ancestry, sex, or handicap.”  
Id. 
 31. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.040 (2000). 
 32. Id. § 213.055. 
 33. Id. § 213.065. 
 34. Id. §§ 213.040, 213.055, 213.065.  The MHRA further protects individuals 
from familial-status-based housing discrimination and age-based employment dis-
crimination.  Id. §§ 213.040, 213.055. 
 35. See id. §§ 213.040, 213.055, 213.065. 
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Because the MHRA does not protect an individual from being fired, de-
nied housing, or denied access to places of public accommodation due to his 
or her sexual orientation, many attempts have been made to solidify such 
protections into Missouri law.  As of 2013, eighteen municipalities had ordi-
nances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity.36  However, these eighteen localities account for only 27% of the 
state’s workforce, and none of these municipalities exist outside the Colum-
bia, Kansas City, or St. Louis areas, leaving those in the state’s rural areas 
unprotected.37  As such, attempts are continually being made to expand pro-
tections to all LGBT Missourians.  In 2010, then-Governor Jay Nixon issued 
an executive order banning orientation-based discrimination in Missouri state 
government.38  Further, legislators yearly propose legislation attempting to 
expand such prohibitions to all workers across the state.39  The most signifi-
cant piece of legislation proposed to further that goal has been the Missouri 
Nondiscrimination Act (“MONA”). 
MONA was first introduced in 199840 and has been reintroduced nu-
merous times over the past several years.41  The proposed legislation would 
amend the MHRA to include both sexual orientation and gender identity as 
protected statuses.42  In 2013, the Missouri Senate passed this legislation with 
bipartisan support; ten Senate Democrats voted in favor of the bill, while nine 
of twenty-three Senate Republicans did the same.43  The bill died in the Mis-
souri House, though, when the House refused to take it up for a vote.44  Re-
spective House45 and Senate46 bills proposing identical additions to the 
MHRA were introduced in 2016, as was a separate House bill that would 
revise the Missouri Commission on Human Rights’s (“MCHR”) complaint  
 36. Mallory et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Igor Volsky, Missouri Governor Issues EO Banning Discrimination Based 
on Sexual Orientation in Executive Branch, THINKPROGRESS (July 26, 2010), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2010/07/26/176897/missouri-discrimination-
executive/. 
 39. Mallory et al., supra note 1, at 5 (“Efforts have been made to pass such a 
comprehensive law in each legislative session since 2001.”); Piper Salvator, Keaveny 
Is Optimistic That the Missouri Nondiscrimination Act Will Pass, MO. TIMES (Jan. 13, 
2015), http://themissouritimes.com/15867/keaveny-optimistic-missouri-
nondiscrimination-act-will-pass/. 
 40. Salvator, supra note 39. 
 41. See S. 237, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 42. Id.; Salvator, supra note 39. 
 43. Jason Hancock, Missouri Court Rules That Law Doesn’t Prohibit Discrimi-
nation Against Gays, KAN. CITY STAR (Oct. 30, 2015, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-
buzz/article42018276.html.  Senate Republicans exclusively cast the eleven votes 
against the bill.  Id.  Three other Senate Republicans did not record a vote.  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. H.R. 2279, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 46. S. 653, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
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process to allow employees to file grievances over discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity.47  None of this legislation passed.48   
These anti-discrimination protections provided by MONA have support 
from both Democrats and Republicans,49 and former Governor Jay Nixon 
encouraged the passage of MONA in his final State of the State address.50  
Further, hundreds of Missouri-based companies, such as Monsanto and 
Sprint, have publicly supported MONA.51  Until the passage of such an 
 
 47. H.R. 1924, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016).  The MCHR over-
sees the enforcement of the MHRA and investigates complaints of discrimination in 
housing, employment, and places of public accommodations.  See Process Once a 
Complaint Is Filed, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., 
http://labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/File_Complaint/complaint_process (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2016).  Currently, the MCHR does not investigate complaints of discrimina-
tion due to sexual orientation or gender identity.  See id. 
 48. Bill Summary of H.R. 2279: Prohibits Discrimination Based on Sexual Ori-
entation or Gender Identity, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016), 
http://house.mo.gov/billsummary.aspx?bill=HB2279&year=2016&code=R; Bill 
Summary of S. 653: Bars Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation or Gender 
Identity, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/16info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=2224
6562; Bill Summary of H.R. 1924: Changes the Laws Regarding Complaints Filed 
with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights Regarding Discrimination Based 
Upon a Person’s Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2016), 
http://house.mo.gov/billsummary.aspx?bill=HB1924&year=2016&code=R. 
 49. Hancock, supra note 43. 
 50. Gov. Nixon Delivers 2016 State of the State Address, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR 
JAY NIXON (Jan. 20, 2016), https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-
delivers-2016-state-state-address (“I repeat my call for the General Assembly to pass 
the Missouri Nondiscrimination Act, which would prohibit discrimination against 
LGBT Missourians in employment, housing and public accommodations.”). 
 51. Colin Murphy, Fortune 500 Companies Voice Support for Mo. Non-
Discrimination Bill, LGBTQ NATION (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/04/fortune-500-companies-voice-support-for-mo-
non-discrimination-bill/.  Other Missouri organizations, however, like the Missouri 
Chamber of Commerce, oppose MONA until a higher standard of proof of discrimi-
nation is required in discrimination cases.  Daniela Sirtori, MONA Back for Another 
Round in the Senate, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/mona-back-for-another-round-
in-the-senate/article_7eb18775-8e1e-504b-b3fa-72d24e5f54a5.html.  In 2007, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the MHRA requires that the plaintiff merely 
allege that the unlawful purpose was a contributing factor, rather than a motivating 
factor, in discrimination claims.  Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 
820 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).  The Chamber of Commerce general counsel has stated 
that the organization will not support MONA as long as the contributing factor stand-
ard is in place.  Sirtori, supra. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/17
2016] WHAT’S MISSING? 1179 
amendment, however, Missouri plaintiffs alleging discrimination based on 
sexual orientation will continue to be unsuccessful in Missouri courts.52 
2.  Other States’ Protections 
Missouri’s failure to protect its residents from sexual orientation-based 
discrimination is unfortunately not an outlier.  Twenty-seven other states join 
Missouri in having no statewide employment non-discrimination laws cover-
ing sexual orientation.53  Two of Missouri’s neighboring states, Illinois and 
Kansas, epitomize the country’s divergence regarding sexual orientation-
based employment protections. 
Illinois has been protecting its workers from workplace discrimination 
based on sexual orientation for over a decade.  In 2005, the state legislature 
amended the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) to prohibit discrimination 
based upon an individual’s sexual orientation.54  “Sexual orientation” is de-
fined in the IHRA as “actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, 
bisexuality, or gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associated 
with the person’s designated sex at birth.”55  By defining sexual orientation to 
include gender identity as well, the law protects transgender individuals even 
 
 52. Missourians are protected against sexual orientation-based discrimination in 
employment in just one narrow context – executive branch employment.  Jerome 
Hunt, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A State-by-State Examination of Non-
discrimination Laws and Policies: State Nondiscrimination Policies Fill the Void but 
Federal Protections Are Still Needed 6 (June 2012) 
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf.  In 2010, then-
Governor Nixon issued an executive order prohibiting Missouri’s Executive Branch 
from engaging in orientation-based employment discrimination.  Id. at 56.  While a 
small measure of progress, the executive order does not provide employees who have 
suffered discrimination a private right of action.  Id.  These protections are thus quite 
minimal. 
 53. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information – Map, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2017).  Nineteen states currently have non-discrimination laws in 
place that include both sexual orientation and gender identity: California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Ver-
mont, and Washington.  Id.  Washington, D.C., has codified such protections as well.  
Id.  Three states – New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin – have enacted legisla-
tion that protects workers from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but 
not gender identity.  Id. 
 54. S. 3186, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005). 
 55. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(O-1) (West 2016).  The statute further 
provides that the definition of sexual orientation “does not include a physical or sexu-
al attraction to a minor by an adult.”  Id. 
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though gender identity is not explicitly listed as a prohibited basis for dis-
crimination.56 
Kansas, meanwhile, has effectively spent the last few years making its 
residents more vulnerable to the threat of workplace discrimination.  In 2015, 
Governor Sam Brownback issued an executive order that removed existing 
protections for gay, lesbian, and transgender state employees.57  The order 
repealed a 2007 executive order by then-Governor Kathleen Sebelius, which 
had put in place prohibitions against employment discrimination based on 
sexual preference and gender identity.58  Governor Brownback reasoned that 
the repeal of Governor Sebelius’s expansion of workplace protections was 
appropriate because such an expansion of anti-discrimination policies should 
come from the legislature, rather than from unilateral executive action.59 
B.  Federal Law 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the federal counterpart to the 
MHRA within the employment realm.60  The two laws are “coextensive, but 
not identical, acts.”61  Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer62 to 
refuse to hire or discharge an individual “because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”63 
Sex, however, was not originally a protected class under the Civil Rights 
Act.64  Rather, an amendment to prohibit sex discrimination was proposed in 
 
 56. Id. § 1-102(A). 
 57. Matt Pearce, Kansas Governor Removes Protections for LGBT Employees, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-kansas-
governor-gay-protection-20150210-story.html. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2012), with MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2000). 
 61. Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006) (emphasis omitted) (citing Hammond v. Mun. Corr. Inst., 117 S.W.3d 130, 136 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 62. “Employer” refers to any “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
 63. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 64. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 12 
(5th ed. 2014) (noting the addition of “sex” to the impermissible bases for employ-
ment discrimination was an amendment to the proposed bill); Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Sex as a basis of discrimination 
was added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII, with-
out prior hearing or debate.”), overruled as recognized by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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a purported attempt to quash the bill altogether.65  The controversial addition 
of “sex” to the bill’s language was intended to protect against gender discrim-
ination; sexual orientation was not contemplated by Congress.66  Though the 
amendment met opposition from the bill’s own supporters, the amendment 
passed in the House by a vote of 168-133.67  The bill eventually passed in the 
Senate as well, the sex amendment intact.68  Citizens thereafter had at least 
some federal law protections from sex-based employment discrimination. 
Like the MHRA, Title VII protects against sex discrimination but does 
not explicitly proscribe discrimination based on sexual preference.69  As such, 
a significant number of federal courts have held that plaintiffs do not have a 
cause of action under Title VII for discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.70  The Eighth Circuit, too, has held that Title VII does not prohibit 
such discrimination.71  To maneuver around this roadblock, many plaintiffs 
who have suffered orientation-based discrimination will bring a Title VII 
claim alleging discrimination based on gender stereotyping.72  The Supreme 
Court has held that a plaintiff has a cognizable Title VII claim for sex-based 
discrimination if he or she properly alleges discrimination based on sex stere-
otyping.73  Thus, if plaintiffs can prove that they were discriminated against 
 
 65. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); see also 
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 64, at 12.  Representative Howard Smith, one of the 
most fervent opponents of the Civil Rights Act, sponsored the amendment.  Id. at 9, 
12.  Some have suggested that the amendment was proposed as something of a joke.  
Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 441 (1966).  For 
example, “Mr. Smith, long-time Chairman of the House Committee on Rules – and 
not a civil rights enthusiast – offered his amendment in a spirit of satire and ironic 
cajolery.”  Id.  However, others have asserted that Chairman Smith was a “long-time 
ally and supporter” of equal rights for women.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 64, at 12. 
 66. See ESKRIDGE  ET AL., supra note 64, at 13. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 13, 20. 
 69. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2000), with Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 70. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Daw-
son v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005); Schroeder v. Hamilton 
Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Richardson v. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc., 232 
F.3d 207, *1 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 
F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 
252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 71. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam). 
 72. See Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title 
VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715, 744–45 (2014) (analyzing 117 cases where plaintiffs 
brought Title VII and Title IX cases on the basis of gender stereotyping). 
 73. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (“We hold that when 
a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving 
9
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based on their failure to conform to gender stereotypes, they may be able to 
survive summary judgment.74  Missouri law does not currently allow for 
similar navigation of the sexual orientation/sexual stereotyping impasse.75 
Much like Missouri, federal law does provide for one narrow context in 
which individuals are protected from sexual preference-based discrimination.  
In 2014, President Obama signed an executive order prohibiting federal con-
tractors and subcontractors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity.76  While the order reached roughly 30,000 companies 
employing twenty-eight million workers,77 these employers only account for 
one-fifth of the country’s workforce,78 leaving the rest, such as James 
Pittman, vulnerable to harassment or termination based on sexual orientation. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A.  Majority Opinion 
In Pittman, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, held that 
the MHRA does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
and thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Pittman’s claim.79  This case 
turned almost entirely on the court’s interpretation of “sex” under the 
MHRA.80  Because “sex” remains undefined in the statute,81 the court turned 
to the familiar canons of statutory interpretation.82  First, it examined the stat-
ute’s plain meaning.83  Employing Webster’s Third New International Dic- 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if 
it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”), superseded by statute for other 
reasons as stated in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
 74. See id.; Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (finding remarks about an employee’s “slightly more masculine” “Ellen 
DeGeneres kind of look” could be sex stereotyping and therefore reversing summary 
judgment). 
 75. See Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2015) (refusing to decide “whether or not the Missouri Human Rights Act pro-
hibits sex discrimination based upon gender stereotyping”), No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. 
LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 26, 2016) (mem.). 
 76. Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
 77. Jennifer Epstein, Obama Signs LGBT Executive Order, POLITICO (July 21, 
2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama-signs-lgbt-
protection-federal-workers-contractors-109174. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 483, 485. 
 80. See id. at 482–83. 
 81. See MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2000). 
 82. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 482.  For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of 
how Missouri courts interpret statutes, see Matthew Davis, Statutory Interpretation in 
Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 1127 (2016) (surveying the various canons invoked by 
Missouri courts). 
 83. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 482. 
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tionary, the court resolved the definition for “sex” under the MHRA: “one of 
the two divisions of human beings respectively designated male or fe-
male[.]”84  Thus, the court concluded that for the purposes of the MHRA, 
“sex” is strictly synonymous with “gender.”85 
The Western District also focused heavily on legislative intent, which it 
referred to as “the pole star of statutory interpretation and construction.”86  It 
noted the several categories of protected classes under the MHRA87 and the 
absence of sexual orientation amongst them.88  The court concluded that “[i]f 
the Missouri legislature had desired to include sexual orientation in the 
[MHRA] protections, it could have done so,”89 recognizing that attempts to 
explicitly include sexual orientation as a protected status under the MHRA 
had repeatedly failed.90  Until sexual orientation is explicitly included as a 
protected status in the statute’s text, discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is not unlawful under the MHRA.91 
Though Pittman and the American Civil Liberties Union, participating 
as amicus curiae, invoked federal Title VII precedent in arguing that the defi-
nition of “sex” encompassed more than just gender, the Western District re-
mained unswayed.92  First and foremost, the MHRA and Title VII “are coex-
tensive, but not identical, acts.”93  Therefore, where the language of the 
MHRA is clear and unambiguous, any contrary federal case law has no bind-
ing effect.94  As established earlier, in the court’s view, the plain, unambigu-
ous meaning of “sex” under the MHRA is equivalent to “gender” and does 
not include sexual orientation.95  Thus, any federal precedent relied upon was 
ultimately unhelpful to Pittman’s claim. 
Moreover, many of Pittman’s supporting federal cases involved claims 
of gender stereotyping, which is a person’s failure to conform “to the em-
ployer’s expectation as to how someone of his or her gender should be-
have.”96  In Pittman, the Western District was eager to note that Pittman did 
 
 84. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2081 (Unabridged 1993)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 483.  The MHRA explicitly provides that discrimination on any of 
these bases is unlawful: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or 
disability.  MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1(1) (2000). 
 88. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 483. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 483 n.5. 
 91. Id. at 483. 
 92. Id. at 483–84. 
 93. Id. at 485 (quoting Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 482. 
 96. Id. at 484. 
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not raise a gender-stereotyping claim in his petition.97  Pittman did not allege 
that he was harassed or terminated based upon his failure to comply with 
societal masculine stereotypes98 but instead explicitly claimed to have been 
discriminated against based on his sexual preference.99  Because of this, the 
court declined to decide whether the MHRA prohibits sex discrimination 
based upon gender stereotyping.100 
Upon its examination of the MHRA’s plain language, legislative intent 
(or lack thereof), and Pittman’s failure to allege an explicit claim of gender 
stereotyping, the Western District concluded that the MHRA does not prohib-
it discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.101  In a separate opinion, 
Judge Robert Clayton, III concurred “reluctantly[,] . . . with respect to the 
result only.”102  As such, the court affirmed 2-1 the trial court’s dismissal of 
Pittman’s petition for failure to state a claim.103 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Anthony Rex Gabbert wrote an extensive dissenting opinion, ob-
jecting to the majority’s conclusions on three main points: (1) the plain mean-
ing of “sex,”104 (2) the majority’s analysis of legislative intent,105 and (3) the 
majority’s failure to recognize the “spirit” of the MHRA.106 
The dissent first challenged the majority’s limited interpretation of the 
word “sex.”107  Because there is no requirement that any particular dictionary 
definition be given preference over another in the absence of a legislative 
definition, the dissent argued that the majority erred in stopping at the first 
listed dictionary definition, rather than considering the entirety of the defini-
tion in its analysis.108  The full definition found in Webster’s Third New In-
ternational Dictionary, the dissent asserts, provides a more complete picture 
of the meaning of “sex” that includes “the phenomena of sexual instincts and 
their manifestations.”109  This definition, if adopted by Missouri courts, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 485. 
 102. Id. (Clayton, J., concurring). 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. Id. at 486 (Gabbert, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 487. 
 106. Id. at 487–88. 
 107. Id. at 486. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  The dissent characterized the full definition as: “(1) one of the two divi-
sions of human beings respectively designated male or female; (2) the sum of the 
morphological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that sub-
servesbiparental reproduction; (3) the sphere of interpersonal behavior especially 
between male and female most directly associated with, leading up to, substituting 
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would expand protections under the MHRA to prohibit discrimination based 
not just on gender, but on sexual orientation as well. 
Next, the dissent questioned the majority opinion’s outcome on legisla-
tive intent.110  The dissent contended that the absence of an explicit provision 
including sexual preference protections within the MHRA is not indicative of 
legislative intent to exclude such protections.111  Rather, it found the Missouri 
General Assembly’s failure to exclude sexual orientation from its broad use 
of “sex” more convincing than its failure to include sexual orientation.112  
Further, the dissent contended that remedial statutes, such as the MHRA, are 
to be construed liberally to include cases “which are within the spirit of the 
law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to 
the case.”113 
The “spirit of the [MHRA]” was repeatedly invoked within the dissent 
and was Judge Gabbert’s third contention with the majority opinion.114  On 
this point, the dissent relied on Baldwin v. Foxx,115 a case in which the EEOC 
stated that “[s]exual orientation discrimination is also sex discrimination be-
cause it is associational discrimination on the basis of sex.”116  Because “sex-
ual orientation is inherently a sex-based consideration,”117 the dissent assert-
ed, a person’s sex is “always considered when taking a person’s sexual orien-
tation into account.”118  Accordingly, under the spirit of the law, sex discrim-
ination claims founded in sexual orientation discrimination are actionable 
under the MHRA.119 
Moreover, the dissent recognized appellate courts’ responsibility when 
reviewing a motion to dismiss to liberally construe pleadings and find facts in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.120  In so doing, Judge Gabbert found 
a cognizable claim of gender stereotyping within Pittman’s petition.121  Be-
cause Pittman alleged that he was treated differently than a similarly situated 
heterosexual coworker, the dissent contended, “gender bias was associated 
 
for, or resulting from genital union; and (4) the phenomena of sexual instincts and 
their manifestations.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1993)). 
 110. Id. at 487. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 487–88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. 
Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 114. Id. at 487–89. 
 115. Baldwin, EEOC DOC 0120133080 (2015), 2015 WL 4397641. 
 116. Id. at *6. 
 117. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 489 (Gabbert, J., dissenting) (quoting Baldwin, 2015 
WL 4397641, at *6). 
 118. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 487–88. 
 121. Id. at 488. 
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with his claims.”122  For these reasons, the dissent would have found that 
Pittman sufficiently stated a claim under the MHRA and would allow a jury 
to determine whether Pittman was indeed the victim of sex-based discrimina-
tion.123 
V.  COMMENT 
When the Western District issued its decision in Pittman, it confirmed 
that LGBT Missourians remain vulnerable to sexual orientation-based dis-
crimination in housing, employment, and public accommodations.  This 
Note’s argument is threefold.  First, this Part discusses the need for LGBT 
anti-discrimination protections in Missouri.  However, due to the current text 
of the law, the Western District ultimately did not misapply the MHRA; in-
deed, the court had little choice but to reach its legal conclusion.124  Accord-
ingly, this Part next analyzes the Pittman dissent and articulates why broad-
ening the definition of “sex” under the MHRA is not the optimal avenue 
through which to expand necessary protections.  Finally, this Part argues that 
to promote the values of fundamental fairness, respect, and equality, the Mis-
souri General Assembly must act to provide Pittman, along with tens of thou-
sands of other Missourians, a cognizable cause of action with which to chal-
lenge LGBT discrimination. 
A.  The Need for Additional Protections 
Despite local ordinances, executive orders, and workplace policies that 
explicitly prohibit sexual preference-based discrimination, discrimination is 
still all too common.125  Numerous incidents highlight the prevalence of 
LGBT discrimination across the state.  For example, in 2007, two kitchen 
workers were fired for being gay,126 and in 2008, a schoolteacher’s contract 
was not renewed due to her sexual orientation.127  Further, studies show a 
high prevalence of employment discrimination against LGBT individuals.  
According to a recent study from the Williams Institute, 15% to 43% of 
LGBT workers have experienced some sort of employment discrimination 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 489. 
 124. See Sarah Rossi, Pass the Missouri Non-Discrimination Act, ACLU MO. 
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.aclu-mo.org/newsviews/2015/10/27/pass-missouri-non-
discrimination-act (“[In Pittman,] the Missouri Court of Appeals made two things 
very clear: Missourians are being harassed, bullied, and fired from their jobs for being 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual and they will have no recourse in the courts unless the State 
Legislature changes the [MHRA] to protect them. . . . The court . . . made clear that 
their hands were tied by Missouri law.”). 
 125. See supra notes 4, 36–39 and accompanying text. 
 126. Mallory et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 127. Id. 
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based on sexual orientation or gender identity.128  Further, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development found that heterosexual couples were fa-
vored over same-sex couples by more than 15% in receiving housing inquiry 
responses.129  In 2010, 47% of transgender Missourians reported having expe-
rienced harassment at work due to their gender identity.130 
A 2016 survey indicated that 90% of Americans ages eighteen to thirty 
believed that gay men and women should have equal rights in the work-
place.131  Undeniably, equal rights in the workplace must include the right to 
be free from discrimination.  Nevertheless, individuals facing such discrimi-
nation in Missouri currently have no legal recourse under state law.132 
The need for additional legal anti-discrimination protections cannot be 
understated.  Studies consistently show the significant impact that discrimina-
tion has on one’s mental health and wellbeing.133  LGBT individuals who fear 
orientation- or identity-based discrimination are much less likely to be open 
about their sexual orientation with their coworkers, which results in feelings 
of isolation and anxiety in the workplace.134  Even individuals who are open 
about their LGBT status are more likely to suffer from depression, psychiatric 
disorders, and low self-esteem.135  Even more, studies demonstrate that a 
significant pay gap exists between straight and gay men with identical 
productivity characteristics.136  A 2011 survey showed that transgender indi-
viduals were unemployed at twice the rate of the general population, and the 
unemployment for transgender people of color was almost four times the 
national rate.137  Discrimination has a significant impact on the lives and live-
 
 128. Marina Villeneuve, Gay Rights Activists Cheer Workplace Discrimination 
Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/10/nation/la-na-
gay-discrimination-20130711. 
 129. Amanda Terkel, Same-Sex Couples Face Significant Housing Discrimina-
tion, Historic Government Study Says, HUFFINGTON POST (June 18, 2013, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/same-sex-housing-
discrimination_n_3455463.html. 
 130. Mallory et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 131. Sarah Grace Taylor & Emily Swanson, Poll: Young Americans Overwhelm-
ingly Favor LGBT Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 9, 2016, 11:17 AM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ea6febc0f5be47c7b2deb67112a2e201/poll-young-
americans-favor-lgbt-rights-adoption-more. 
 132. Sophia Petenakis, Transgenders Face Job Challenges in Mid-Mo., KOMU 
(Mar. 28, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.komu.com/news/transgenders-face-job-
challenges-in-mid-mo-/. 
 133. Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Dis-
crimination & Its Effects on LGBT People, WILLIAMS INST. 12 (July 2011), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-
Discrimination-July-20111.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 12–13, 15–16. 
 135. Id. at 15–16. 
 136. Id. at 14. 
 137. Id. 
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lihoods of LGBT employees, but due to the Western District’s interpretation 
of the word “sex,” these individuals currently have no legal recourse. 
B.  “Sex” Under the MHRA 
Pittman turned on the court’s interpretation of the meaning of “sex.”  As 
discussed in Part IV, Judge Gabbert authored a thorough dissent in Pittman in 
which he pushed for a broader interpretation of the word “sex”138 – still the 
word’s plain meaning, he asserted, but including a more encompassing defi-
nition in order to better protect Missourians from discrimination.139  Though 
Judge Gabbert’s dissent is thoughtfully written and rightfully sympathetic to 
victims of discrimination, stretching the definition of “sex” to encompass 
sexual orientation does not comport with the statute’s text. 
1.  The MHRA’s Plain Language 
Under the “ordinary meaning” doctrine of statutory interpretation, courts 
are to assume that, unless a word is otherwise defined, the legislature intend-
ed to give the word its ordinary, common meaning.140  Interpreters are en-
couraged to start with the typical meaning of a term in question – not neces-
sarily the dictionary definition, but the connotation that an ordinary or rea-
sonable person would give to the term.141  Using the “ordinary meaning” 
maxim, the most straightforward result would be the interpretation the 
Pittman majority adopted; to the ordinary person, sex is synonymous with 
gender and likely does not encapsulate sexual orientation. 
The Pittman majority and dissent both relied on dictionary definitions of 
“sex,” each finding a different definition to fit its interpretation.142  Neverthe-
less, sex is both commonly understood to mean, and primarily defined in 
dictionaries to mean, the biological distinction between male and female.143  
Although Judge Gabbert found a definition of “sex” that encompasses sexual 
orientation, courts should not resort to parsing dictionary definitions in order 
to find a definition that fits.144  The plain meaning of “sex” is synonymous 
 
 138. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015) (Gabbert, J., dissenting), No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 
26, 2016) (mem.). 
 139. See id. 
 140. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
 141. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 64, at 645. 
 142. Compare Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 482, with Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 486 
(Gabbert, J., dissenting). 
 143. See, e.g., Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 144. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1448 (1994) (“[J]udges can use dictionaries subjectively either 
to concretize or to blur statutory and constitutional terms, without abandoning the 
veneer of textual objectivity.”). 
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with gender.145  Furthermore, though Missouri does not provide much legisla-
tive intent guidance because its committee reports are not published, it is un-
likely that the Missouri General Assembly in 1959 was looking to prohibit 
sexual orientation-based discrimination.  For these reasons, the court correct-
ly applied the law when it interpreted the MHRA to prohibit only gender-
based discrimination. 
2.  Broadening the Definition of “Sex” 
Though the language of the MHRA provides a prohibition only on sex-
based discrimination, the dissent makes several arguments advocating for an 
expansion of the definition of “sex.”146  These arguments have merit, and thus 
a discussion of the dissent is warranted.  The dissent seeks to find within the 
MHRA a discernable way for Pittman and numerous other individuals to 
bring claims alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation.147  To do so, 
Judge Gabbert argued that the court should adopt a broader definition of 
“sex,” finding support in past cases in which courts have extended sex be-
yond the typical gender-based considerations.148  For example, in Price Wa-
terhouse, the Supreme Court held that when an employer insists that an em-
ployee conform to stereotypical attributes of his or her gender, the employer 
“has acted on the basis of gender,”149 and the employee may bring a cause of 
action for sex-based discrimination under Title VII.150  One could reason that 
Pittman, by dating a man instead of a woman, failed to conform to a stereo-
typical assumption commonly associated with his gender.  A rational argu-
ment may be made that if this were the basis of Pittman’s termination, Cook 
Paper acted on the basis of gender stereotypes in violation of the MHRA. 
The argument is made clearer still in Baldwin, where the EEOC con-
cluded that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’”151 
and, accordingly, “discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily 
an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”152  The EEOC deter-
mined that the question is not whether sexual orientation is an explicitly pro-
tected status but whether the sexual orientation claim “is the same as any 
other Title VII case involving allegations of sex discrimination – whether the 
[employer] has ‘relied on sex-based considerations’”153 in its employment 
action. 
 
 145. Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 146. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 486–89 (Gabbert, J., dissenting). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 486–87. 
 149. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), superseded by stat-
ute for other reasons as stated in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Baldwin, EEOC DOC 0120133080 (2015), 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 n.3. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *4. 
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These cases provide support to the dissent’s ultimate argument that 
“sex” under the MHRA expands beyond gender.  However, where the MHRA 
is clear and unambiguous, neither contrary federal case law nor administra-
tive agency decisions are binding.154  If the statute were ambiguous, this logic 
may have swayed the Western District.  Perhaps if Pittman had alleged sex 
stereotyping – that his discrimination had been based on his failure to con-
form to the sexual stereotype that men, generally, are attracted to women – he 
may have survived Cook Paper’s motion to dismiss under a Price Waterhouse 
theory.  Regardless, complainants, including Pittman, should not have to 
jump through pleading hoops and allege an ill-fitting claim of sexual stereo-
typing in order to state a claim for discrimination; the law instead should pro-
vide a remedy for sexual orientation-based discrimination. 
This remedy is not made available by Pittman, which extends beyond 
the instant case and precludes all LGBT Missourians from bringing suit alleg-
ing orientation-based discrimination.  Pittman was a close case – a three-
judge panel split two to one,155 with the concurring judge doing so “reluctant-
ly.”156  This reluctance reasonably reflects the fact that the underlying law 
guiding the Western District is simply flawed.  The MHRA was enacted to 
protect Missourians from discrimination, but its inadequacies prevent it from 
truly fulfilling its intended function.  The law must keep up with social pro-
gress.  Accordingly, to fulfill the “spirit of the law,”157 a statutory amendment 
to the MHRA expanding its protections will likely be the most efficacious 
way to enact tangible change. 
C.  Amending the MHRA 
As discussed in Part III, there have been many proposed statutory 
amendments to the MHRA over the past two decades that would include sex-
ual orientation in the statute’s list of protected classes.  Because the Western 
District’s disagreement over the definition of “sex” likely reflects society’s 
evolving understanding of the term, and because a court’s statutory interpre-
tation will always be vulnerable to subsequent legislative action, the only 
infallible way to ensure protections for LGBT Missourians is to amend the 
MHRA to include explicit protections from sexual preference-based discrim-
ination.  MONA was first introduced in 1998;158 now, in 2017, it is time for 
such a statutory amendment to become law.  For the following reasons, Mis-
 
 154. Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 155. See generally, Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2015), No. SC95403, 2016 Mo. LEXIS 23, at *1 (Mo. Jan. 26, 2016) 
(mem.). 
 156. Id. at 485 (Clayton, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. at 488 (Gabbert, J., dissenting). 
 158. Salvator, supra note 39. 
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souri should adopt statutory protections similar or identical to the IHRA’s 
provision codifying anti-discrimination protections for LGBT individuals.159 
Pittman’s lawsuit was rooted in sexual orientation-based discrimina-
tion;160 he did not allege any discrimination based upon his gender identity, 
and this Note has exclusively addressed sexual orientation-based discrimina-
tion thus far.  However, the discussion of sexual orientation oftentimes leads 
to the discussion of gender identity.  Though sexual orientation and gender 
identity are two distinct matters, they are often addressed simultaneously.  All 
LGBT Missourians, including transgender Missourians, must be free from 
workplace, housing, and public accommodations discrimination.  As such, 
Missouri must also enact protections for transgender individuals and can do 
so when it amends the MHRA to include protections from sexual orientation-
based discrimination. 
Perhaps the simplest way to accomplish the goal of protecting Missouri-
ans from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity would 
be to pass a bill similar to the numerous bills introduced over the past several 
years, such as SB 653.161  This bill would have amended section 213.010 by 
adding sexual orientation and gender identity to its definition of “discrimina-
tion.”162  It would have also incorporated the following language in the stat-
ute’s definition: 
Discrimination includes any unfair treatment based on a person’s pre-
sumed or assumed race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, [or] age as it relates to employ-
ment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing, whether or 
not the presumption or assumption as to such characteristics is cor-
rect.163 
This provision, if added, would include even further protection for Mis-
sourians, as employers, landlords, or other entities would be unable to con-
struct a defense that there could have been no discrimination due to some 
characteristic because the alleged victim does not possess that characteris-
tic.164  The passage of such a bill and subsequent amendment of the MHRA 
would have been but a minor change to the statute’s text, yet it would have 
been a significant step in improving anti-discrimination protections in Mis-
souri.  Nevertheless, SB 653, like many bills that have come before it, failed 
to reach even a floor vote in the Senate.165 
 
 159. S. 3186, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005). 
 160. See Appellant’s Initial Brief, supra note 14, at 5. 
 161. S. 653, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Bill Summary of S. 653: Bars Discrimination Based on Sexual Orienta-
tion or Gender Identity, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016), 
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Passing such an amendment, however, may not be so simple.  The Mis-
souri General Assembly has recently proposed bills that would restrict the 
rights of transgender Missourians.166  Accordingly, a certain reluctance within 
the legislature to pass an amendment prohibiting gender identity-based dis-
crimination may be presumed.  Adopting language identical to the IHRA167 
may therefore be the surest and smoothest path to enacting significant 
change. 
The structure and language of the IHRA should be carefully considered 
when amending the MHRA.  As discussed above, the IHRA explicitly pro-
hibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.168  While it does not include 
gender identity in its list of prohibited discrimination bases, it includes gender 
identity in its definition of “sexual orientation.”169  Transgender Illinoisans 
are therefore protected from discrimination under the IHRA.170  This is the 
format that Missouri should follow if it wants to create a realistic amendment 
to protect LGBT Missourians from discrimination. 
First, Missouri should amend the MHRA’s relevant provisions171 to in-
clude a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The text in 
each section should prohibit discrimination because of “race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, sexual orientation, ancestry, or age, as it relates to” em-
ployment, housing, or public accommodations access. 
Next, the Missouri General Assembly must include an explicit definition 
of “sexual orientation” in the MHRA’s general definitions section.172  Mis-
souri should adopt the following definition of “sexual orientation”: “an indi-




 166. See H.R. 1624, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); S. 720, 98th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (both propose restricting bathroom access 
based on biological sex). 
 167. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West 2016). 
 168. Id.  The Act prohibits “discrimination against any individual because of his 
or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection 
status, marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual orientation, 
pregnancy, or unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with em-
ployment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of 
public accommodations.”  Id. 
 169. Id. § 1-103(O-1).  “‘Sexual orientation’ means actual or perceived heterosex-
uality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or gender-related identity, whether or not tradi-
tionally associated with the person’s designated sex at birth.  ‘Sexual orientation’ 
does not include a physical or sexual attraction to a minor by an adult.”  Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.040, 213.055, 213.065 (2000). 
 172. Id. § 213.010. 
 173. This language tracks the language found in the IHRA and covers the same 
ground as the proposed provision in SB 653 regarding the presumption or assumption 
that an individual possesses a certain characteristic.  See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/1-103(O-1); S. 653, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
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or an individual’s gender identity, regardless of whether or not that identity is 
the same or different from the individual’s sex assigned at birth.”174  With 
these amendments, Missourians will be able to assert claims of discrimination 
based upon gender identity or sexual preference, expanding the scope of anti-
discrimination protections across the state. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, 160,000 Missourians can legally be discriminated against be-
cause of their LGBT status.175  Missouri should not, and cannot, continue to 
sit idly by as state after state elects to make social progress in their anti-
discrimination laws.  Incorporating the above language into the MHRA 
would be the smoothest path to ensure that all Missourians are protected from 
discrimination.  Missouri cannot continue playing catch-up to progress; it is 
time for the Missouri General Assembly to protect its constituents and ensure 
that all Missourians, including LGBT Missourians, are afforded the protec-




 174. This language is considerably similar to that found in the IHRA.  § 1-103(O-
1).  Because the IHRA is a complete, well-written statute that protects LGBT Illinois-
ans from discrimination, this Note proposes that Missouri adopt language similar to, 
or even identical to, the IHRA. 
 175. Mallory et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
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